FISHING FOR LEAVE

HOUSE OF LORDS

EUROPEAN UNION COMMITTEE
Energy and Environment Sub-Committee
Brexit: Fisheries

September 2016

SAVE BRITAIN'S FISH

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1. ***Which are the most urgent priorities for the UK's negotiations with the EU on future relationship with the EU regarding fisheries and why?***

    a. *What should the UK aim to achieve from this negotiation?*

1.1 The priority should be to ensure a UK withdrawal and repeal the European Communities Act 1972. Thereafter as the EU treaties will cease to apply upon the UK's withdrawal, an automatic restoration of national control over the UK EEZ out to 200 nautical miles/the median line and all living marine resources therein as per the provisions of international law will occur. The United Kingdom will regain her exclusive rights, competence and control over all fisheries resources within the UK EEZ as per the provisions provided by UNCLOS III (see Question 6).

1.2 Thereafter it will be within the rights and sole discretion of Her Majesty's Government to exercise management over these resources for the benefit of the nation and its fishing industry. The UK can implement a decent, fit for purpose management policy for the benefit of the whole UK industry, all involved within the industry, and the coastal communities that depend upon it.

1.3 It should be ensured that the CFP disaster is not replicated into British law. The British Fishing Industry, and the British people's resource was betrayed once before in 1972 when sacrificed in order to join the then EEC. The electorate are aware of that situation now, and a repeat performance will not be tolerated.

1.4 The UK EEZ includes some of the most productive and prime aquatic real estate in the world, with the majority of EU catches being taken from what should, and will be, UK waters. A large proportion of the EU fish resources are found inside our EEZ. Tragically, due to our membership of the EU, for the past 40 years these resources, and control over them, have been ceded to the EU. This was enshrined in the EU treaties and the regulations derived from them – through a series of regulations this created the EU Common Fisheries Policy. Resultantly, this allowed previously UK waters and resources to be exploited by every EU member state under the principle of equal access to a common resource (see Question 5). With every succeeding treaty and regulation, the noose of the CFP has tightened around the UK industry.

1.5 The deprivation of our own resources has resulted in around on average:

i) 70% of fisheries resources in the waters around the UK being held by other EU member states, being of the value in the region of around £1-1.5bn.

ii) 60% of the UK fleet has been scrapped as a result of this lack of resources and resultantly towns synonymous with fishing have been destroyed. There is no major fishing port left between Plymouth and Peterhead such has been the UK industries demise under EU membership and the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP).

2. ***Is it in the UK's interest to restrict access to UK waters for foreign vessels?***

a. What impact could that have on reciprocal access rights and UK fishermen?

b. Which UK and non-UK Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) are most important to the UK fishing industry and which should the UK prioritise continued access to?

2.1 The United Kingdom has the richest fishing grounds in Europe with the majority of EU catches being taken in our waters. With the UK having the lion's share of resources, reciprocal access, forced unrestricted upon us through the founding tenant of the CFP – *Equal access to a common resource*, is a one-way street massively to our detriment.

2.2 Should the UK and EU mutually excluded their respective fleets although, in the case of a few fisheries and areas, there would be some loss to a small number of the UK fleet, it would mean an adjustment in fishing patterns more than compensated for with the huge volume of fisheries resources repatriated to the UK.

The data below show that the majority of the UK effort and catches across all species are caught in the UK EEZ.



Value of UK landings from over-15m vessels, by area of catch (2014)

Area	Value (£ million)	%
UK waters	426.7	79
EU waters (excl. UK)	89.5	17
Other waters	23.8	4
Total	**540.0**	**100**

Source: UK Fishing Activity for >=15m Vessels 2014, MMO.

Due to this and with the EU EEZ representing little overall benefit to the UK it would be in the best interests of the UK to close access to our waters for the EU fleet with the loss of reciprocal access not fundamentally detrimental to our interest when weighed against what is gained to that lost.

2.3 Her Majesty's Government should only barter on a basis of equal exchange and only when absolutely necessary. (example - in regard to Scallop access in the EU sector of the English Channel).
With so much to gain and little to lose reciprocal access SHOULD NOT become Equal Access in all but name. It is also imperative that NO British fisheries resources are traded away spuriously either in regards to fisheries or in the wider political context.
The UK fishing industry was regarded as "expendable" during our accession with cataclysmic consequences resulting in the decimation of the UK industry and communities – this MUST NOT happen again. In the terms of Brexit this would be a fundamental and dire sell out and not politically expedient to do so**.**

2.4 a) During the referendum campaign DEFRA outlined that the UK "caught £100m outside UK waters". However, in return we lose around a billion pounds worth of resources which are being caught around our shores by other EU member states fleets.[1]



On joining the then EEC the UK ceded control of fisheries to the EU. The EU, taking fisheries as an exclusive competence, subsumed all member states fisheries into a Common Policy (CFP). Consequently what were previously UK fisheries resources became EU fisheries resources and through the subsequent (Regulation 170/83 -articles 2&3)[2] quotas and relative stability were established and these resources were divided out to all members under the policy of Equal Access to a common resource.
With Brexit these resources automatically become the UK's again, upon withdrawal, as outlined in Question 5, all treaties and regulations cease to apply and therefore relative stability and quotas with it, therefore with the end of equal access, quotas and relative stability a huge proportion of the fisheries resource, which is rightfully Britain's but has been subsumed by the EU through the terms of our membership, will return to the UK. It is then Under UNCLOS 3 at the UKs discretion how to manage and allocate these resources.
This represents, on average across all stocks, somewhere in the region of a 250% increase in the resources available to the UK and the British fleet.
This colossal repatriation of our own resources will more than compensate for the comparatively smaller losses.

1. http://theconversation.com/fact-check-is-80-of-uk-fish-given-away-to-the-rest-of-europe-39966
2. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:31983R0170&qid=1472639412514&from=EN

2.5 b) The first priority should be to secure our own EEZ and resources as this represents the vast majority of UK catches as detailed in the tables above. Aside from this the most important country currently is Norway. Looking to the future the other Nordic countries represent areas where significant mutually beneficial agreements could be drawn. Norway, Great Britain, Faroe, Iceland and Greenland together effectively control the whole North East Atlantic, together these countries, working in conjunction with one another as independent sovereign nations, have the potential to construct sustainable, environmentally and economically fit for purpose fisheries regimes and policy. Each of these nations has a fundamental direct stakeholder interest in well managed fisheries with fisheries being economically fundamental to most. Unlike in the EU, where 28 nations, many without coastlines, use fisheries as a pawn in a bigger political integration project.

3. Should the UK seek to preserve access to free trade in fish? What trade-offs would likely be necessary in order to preserve access to free trade in fish and seafood?

3.1 Although it would be preferable to have tariff free access to the EU it should not be seen as critical when weighed against the benefit of the huge resources we reclaim. Tariff free access should not override the reclamation of our fisheries resources within our EEZ – the fundamentally obvious truism applies: *'You Have to be able to Catch it before you can Sell it'*
Therefore, there should be NO trade off in fisheries access or resources in return for tariff free access to the single market.

3.2 DEFRA noted that we *"export fish and fish products worth £1bn"* – However, if Britain reclaimed the 70% of TACs in British waters assigned by the EU under the CFP to other member states then this figure could more than double.
Currently we are allowing the raw product to be caught for free and landed to the continental market undermining our market share whilst losing the financial benefit of this fish to boats, processors, supporting industry, communities and the UK exchequer & economy. This is not the type of policy that made Britain a mighty nation.

3.3 If there is such a high level of exports then prime British seafood is obviously in demand and that demand from the consumers will remain whether we are signed up to a political project or not. It is often forgotten that trade is between buyer and seller not politicians. As UK seafood is renowned worldwide for its quality and standard it is hard to foresee demand subsiding. With EU vessels unable to exploit the UKs rich fisheries resources there will be increased demand for the fish the British fleet will be catching in place of the continental fleet taking it for 'free'.

3.4 Even if tariffs were applied a few things must be remembered:
1) The current guidelines and parameters set by the World Trade Organisation (WTO) would not see punitive tariffs applied even if there were a desire to do so as 'punishment'.
2) UK Seafood is a world renowned product – the UK pelagic fleet (herring & mackerel) among others in the shellfish sector (razor fish, scallops) show the global potential of UK fisheries exports around the world.
3) A multitude of other nations around the globe export to the EU without being in a political union and without being in the 'free' market.
We see nothing to suggest that even with the apocalyptic assumption that the door to the EU was entirely closed that UK seafood could not diversify into the hungry global markets as others already do or be channelled into domestic demand.

3.5 In summary. Norway, Faroe, Iceland and Greenland are the closest fishing nations to the EU, all are independent countries out with the EU yet export fisheries products to the EU far in excess of the UK without difficulty.
Trade would continue as the UK along with Norway and the other Nordic countries would control a vast proportion of the EU's seafood supply.
With a large population of hungry mouths to feed it is difficult to imagine the EU cutting off its nose to spite its face.

4. ***What approach to achieving Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) and sustainable fisheries would be in the UK's best interest outside of the CFP?***
   a. Should the UK continue to co-ordinate Total Allowable Catches (TACs) and quotas with the EU and neighbouring countries?
   b. To what extent should the UK preserve current TACs and quotas?
   c. Could, or should, the UK seek to renegotiate the relative stability key?

4.1 The Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) is universally recognised and derided as an abject failure even by the EU itself. As the Treaties, and therefore the CFP, cease to apply upon UK withdrawal, this represents a golden chance of a clean slate. The UK's best interests would be served with the implementation of our own fit for purpose management plan tailored to the unique mixed fisheries around the UK with an end to quotas and a transitional move to days at sea taking account of current track records/fqa units. It is a golden opportunity to implement a British fisheries management policy, devised and tested over the next two years. This cannot by any measure, least of all politically, afford to be squandered.
It is CRITICAL that for either political or a minority in the industry's convenience the CFP is not replicated into British law.

4.2 a) i) TACs are set after agreements internationally through the NEAFC and ICES They set a total allowable catch for each sea area. Thereafter it is open to each independent coastal state as to how to manage the proportion of the resource in its EEZ as under the provisions of UNCLOS III.
ii) Quotas and relative stability are a construct and mechanism devised under the CFP (Regulation 170/83 articles 2&3) [1] to allocate the EU resources to each member state and to facilitate the overall primary objective of the CFP which was an EU fleet with equal access to a common resource. Upon UK withdrawal the treaties and therefore the CFP cease to apply and the UK fisheries resources will return to the UK in their entirety - there are no quotas or relative stability to negotiate as they cease to apply with the Treaties and CFP, thereafter the UK can implement a fit for purpose, workable policy that works in UK mixed fisheries.

4.3 b) Quotas, conservationally and operationally, have failed disastrously to work in the highly mixed fishery around the UK coast. Quotas are the primary cause of mass discarding. As the noble Lords noted in a previous Discards Paper, discards caused by quotas result in increased fishing effort and stock mortality, as vessels have to catch more and land less as fishermen are forced to discard what quotas do not allow them to keep. They also cause inaccurate catch reporting. A discard ban addresses merely the symptoms, not the cause.

4.4 Quotas fail to work as they try to manage on an individual species approach when vessels cannot help but catch a mix of fish and have resulted in a plethora of legislative sticky plasters to bash a square peg into a round hole.
Therefore a different approach to domestic management is needed that is applicable to the UK's mixed fisheries – days at sea taking account of current track records/fqa allocations would be preferable – the policy must fit the environment, not try to make the environment fit the policy.

4.5 Sustainable fisheries are critical to not only the well-being of the marine environment but also the industry and communities that depend upon them.
This is often forgotten and for too long fishermen have been portrayed as environmental pirates to suit various agendas. The UK fleet has made tremendous innovation, sacrifices and progress to rebuild the booming stocks we have now in spite of the CFP.

1. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:31983R0170&qid=1472639412514&from=EN

4.5 i) Upon UK withdrawal a future British Fisheries Management Policy should force scientists and fishermen to work together in a framework of mutual dependence accounting for one another's expertise/knowledge to ensure accurate real time stock assessment and an end to mutual distrust – such a system operates in Norway to great success.

4.7 ii) A British Fisheries management policy should rationalise the multitude of technical measures into a concise UK wide set of standards. Currently EU rules have a ridiculous multitude of technical measures for a multitude of areas.

4.8 iii) A management system applicable in the highly mixed fisheries around the UK should be implemented. Days at sea would be preferable taking account of current track records/fqas. Days at sea would automatically end discards, end the regulatory morass of the quota regime, would allow and incentivise accurate reporting in contrast to the misreporting under quotas.

4.9 Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) is a noble objective, and the UK is a signatory of the 2002 Johannesburg agreement, every fishermen wants stocks that can be harvested ad-infinitum at their maximum levels. However the practicalities and realities of the marine environment must be accounted for. Regarding MSY policy aims should be reality based rather than objective based with the impossible, stringent targets the EU has made itself. It must be recognised that species in a marine ecosystem are interdependent and predate on one another. MSY looks at species individually however it is impossible to have maximum levels of every species. The UK should look at the Icelandic/Faroese pyramid model. This shows that rather than treat each stock separately we should see the marine environment as a whole – therefore rather than remove individual blocks destabilising the pyramid(ecosystem) we should aim to take an even slice down the side of the pyramid across all species and sizes. Days at Sea allowing keep what you catch would facilitate this whereas quotas are forcing fishermen to target specific stocks and sizes and are resulting in excess effort as vessels have to catch more and land less whilst discarding what they cannot keep.

4.10 c) Speaking of relative stability fundamentally fails to recognise what relative stability is and understand the construct of the CFP and its primary equal access objectives. Relative stability is an EU construct that is no longer applicable upon withdrawal. The UKs EEZ and marine resource in their entirety return entirely to the UK under international law.
There will be nothing to negotiate – all the resources defined in UK waters currently held by other EU member states and allocated under an EU system will automatically return to the UK.

4.11 **Suggesting or recognising Relative Stability or Quotas in anyway gives the EU system credence and runs the huge danger of the status quo continuing. It would, in effect, be the UK running a CFP mark II in parallel to the EU. This would allow the continuation of Equal access and a division of UK resources among the remaining EU member states – this would be an abject (second) betrayal of the UK industry, a UK national resource and of Brexit and would be totally unacceptable.**

5. What opportunities and constraints will affect the UK's ability to achieve its priorities and objectives in negotiations about a future EU-UK relationship regarding fisheries?

The context of this question needs to be clarified as to whether it means pre or post UK withdrawal?

5.1 There is little to be pessimistic about regarding a UK withdrawal with the level of resources repatriated being immense.

5.2 Pre-Brexit – As the EU has slowly subsumed control over tracts of policy layer upon layer it has come to resemble an onion. With an initial core and then a plethora of rules and regulations taking their power and authority from the provisions of the previous all underpinned by the provisions of the Treaties. This began with the Treaty of Accession 1972 (1) and the European Communities Act 1972. (2) Article 100 of the Treaty of Accession made the UK party to the provisions of Article 2 of Regulation 2141/70 (3) the EU control over fisheries and providing for equal access. Thereafter Regulation 170/83 (4) created the CFP, Relative stability and quotas. Subsequently on these founding tenants and principles a plethora of rules has been implemented.

5.3 However, agreed and signed by all EU member states, Article 3 of the Lisbon treaty (5) says:

Article 3. The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification referred to in paragraph 2,

Therefore as the whole body of EU law will cease to apply the onion will unravel back to the start. Thereafter under the provisions of the UK Fisheries Limits Act 1976 (6) we will have our UK EEZ 200nm/ median line limit with control of all resources therein as per international law under the provisions of UNCLOS III.

5.4 Post-Brexit – With control over one of the foremost EEZs and fisheries resources in the world there is little benefit to be incurred in negotiations with the EU regarding fisheries and little to restrict the UK from doing so in a limited manner if so desired.

1. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:1972:073:FULL&from=EN
2. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1972/68/section/2
3. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:31970R2141&qid=1472655586100&from=ENgiving
4. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:31983R0170&qid=1472639412514&from=EN
5. http://www.lisbon-treaty.org/wcm/the-lisbon-treaty/treaty-on-European-union-and-comments/title-6-final-provisions/137-article-50.html
6. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1976/86/contents

6. ***What obligations to co-operate on fisheries management exist under international law?***
   a. How will this affect the UK's ability to restrict access for foreign vessels to the UK?
   b. To what extent will historical access rights affect the ability to restrict foreign vessels from accessing UK waters, or other countries' ability to restrict UK access to their waters?
   c. Will the UK be able to restrict access for vessels that are UK based, though owned by an EU company before and after Brexit?

6.1 **International law regarding fisheries is laid down in UNCLOS III (United Nations Law of the Sea 3) of which both the UK (1996) and the EU (1997) are signatories. It came into force on 16th November 1994. UNCLOS III outlines the agreements on fisheries in Articles 62, 63 & 64. Upon reading UNCLOS it becomes clear when the UK withdraws, and the EU treaties are no longer binding as agreed in Article 50 section 3 of the Lisbon treaty, that full control will revert to the UK with UNCLOS giving the UK the right under international law to formally declare its own EEZ and manage its own fisheries at its own discretion the same as Norway and Iceland and most other nations.**

We feel it is important to quote UNCLOS III at length below as it is the fundamental underpinning of international fisheries agreements. [1]

Article 61.The coastal State shall determine the allowable catch of the living resources in its exclusive economic zone.
The coastal State, taking into account the best scientific evidence available to it, shall ensure through proper conservation and management measures that the maintenance of the living resources in the exclusive economic zone is not endangered by over-exploitation. Such measures shall also be designed to maintain or restore populations of harvested species at levels that can produce the economic factors, **including the economic needs of coastal fishing communities.**

Article 62.2 Utilization of the living resources
The coastal State shall determine ***its*** *capacity to harvest the living resources of the EEZ. Where the coastal State does not have the capacity to harvest the entire allowable catch, it shall, through agreements or other arrangements…give other States access to the* ***surplus of the allowable catch****.*

Article 63.1 Stocks occurring within the exclusive economic zones of two or more coastal States or both within the exclusive economic zone and in an area beyond and adjacent to it.
Where the same stock or stocks of associated species occur within the exclusive economic zones of two or more coastal States, these States shall seek, either directly or through appropriate sub-regional or regional organizations, to agree upon measures necessary to coordinate and ensure the conservation and development of such stocks without prejudice to the other provisions of this Part.

6.2 a) Reading the above it becomes clear that it will be at the UK's discretion as to who, how and when can fish in the UK EEZ. This is not unusual and the precedent was set in the 1970s with the best example being the UK distant water fleet being kicked out of Norwegian and Icelandic waters. It will then be a UK's decision as to who, how and what can be fished in our waters and as outlined in Question 2 of this paper that should be UK vessels only.

1. http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part5.htm

6.3 b) As far as our research thus far can ascertain, there are no international recognitions of historical rights for EU or other vessels fishing in our waters. All rights for other EU member states to fish around the UK are derived from EU treaties and regulations. As these will fall so too will these vessels right of access. The UK could (indeed did) claim historical rights in Icelandic and Norwegian waters and history shows us this would be a non-starter.

6.4 It must be understood that the tragic CFP is not a natural state of affairs and that other independent sovereign nations manage their fisheries within their Exclusive Economic Zone Exclusively.
It is because the UK ceded control over our EEZ and fisheries to the EU that other EU member states can fish in our waters under Equal Access to a common resource (Regulation 2141/70, Article 2)[1] and have been given the rights to do so through an EU quota system underpinned by Regulation 170/83[2] that create the CFP.
Therefore, as through the terms of the Lisbon Treaty Article 50 Section 3[3] the treaties will cease to apply so too will the Regulations and therefore the CFP and equal access and quota.

6.5 c) It is not clear if by UK based but EU owned it is meant:
-i) Vessels registered in the EU but operating from UK port(s).
-ii) Vessels registered in the UK but owned in the EU.

i) If a vessel is registered in the EU whether it has based its operation around and operating from the UK is irrelevant. With the Treaties, Regulations and the CFP no longer binding on our withdrawal and reverting back to the terms of UNCLOS III these vessels will no longer have the right or ability to enter, fish or be allocated resources in the UK EEZ.

ii) Vessels registered in the UK because of other provisions within the EU are in a different situation. So called 'Flag Ships' are vessels on the British registry however they are owned in the EU – this allows them to not only fish UK waters but do so against the UK share of EU quota.

6.6 The Merchant Shipping Act 1988 [4] was an attempt by the UK government to stop Flag Ships and 'quota hopping' however, it was found to be in breach of European Union law by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) after the Factortame case 1989. [5]
As the United Kingdom will no longer be bound by the ECJ and EU treaties then the situation regarding Flag Ships should revert back to the UK. With the UK having control through the merchant shipping acts the government will have the right and ability to remove EU owned but British registered fishing vessels.

6.8 If Flag ships cannot be removed, then the "economic link" specified in UK legislation for Fishing Vessel registration should be strengthened. This economic link is a provision that a British register a fishing vessel must land a proportion of its catches into the UK and must be crewed by a proportion of British nationals so the UK benefits economically Currently this is neither strong enough or rigorously enforced.
To regenerate the UK fishing industry, domestic and flag ship vessels should be made to land and sell/process all catches in the UK and that nearly all the crew must be British.

1. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:31970R2141&qid=1472640346559&from=EN
2. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:31983R0170&qid=1472639412514&from=EN
3. http://www.lisbon-treaty.org/wcm/the-lisbon-treaty/treaty-on-European-union-and-comments/title-6-final-provisions/137-article-50.html
4. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1988/12/contents
5. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A61989CJ0213
   https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/R_(Factortame_Ltd)_v_Secretary_of_State_for_Transport

7. ***What type of relationship with the EU and neighbouring countries would be preferable for securing effective regional management and co-operation?***

a. With whom should the UK seek to establish bilateral relationships?
b. What type of governance framework could the UK pursue?
c. What approach to dispute resolution could be desirable?

7.1 As outlined previously it will be at the UKs discretion and control to exercise whatever system we see fit in our EEZ under international law and the terms of UNCLOS III. With the superb resources we have within our EEZ it would be advisable to have only broad agreements when and where necessary under UNCLOS III regarding conservation of shared and migratory stocks.
This can be done along with the other Coastal States at the North East Atlantic Fisheries Council (NEAFC). With the format of safeguarding ones own resources in place it will allow and encourage suitable sustainable management.
The UK should, regarding fisheries, aim and legislate to never become enmeshed in a disaster like the CFP ever again. The UK's fishing industry and dependent coastal communities have been destroyed and/or decimated once and cannot, and should not, be a second time.

7.2 a) Preferably the UK could and should look to work closely with Norway and the other Nordic nations through the NEAFC. The EU EEZ has little to offer the UK however as outlined previously Norway, UK, Faroe, Iceland and Greenland will control the whole NE Atlantic and could look to co-operate in a broad unbinding framework to manage and husband this colossal resource.

7.3 b) Any governance framework should not jepordize our exclusive rights over the UK EEZ. We should agree broad targets regarding conservation with the other coastal states and thereafter manage our resources under a British Fisheries Management Plan. Thereafter any further specific agreements with the other Nordic nations can be agreed on an individual needs basis.

7.4 c) UNCLOS III and the NEAFC should be the medium which the UK should look to operate through. The ideological approach should be to safeguard our own resources for our own benefit rigorously. Iceland, Norway, Faroe, etc. appear to be able to avoid and resolve disputes in this manner and we see no reason why this cannot work for the UK away from the integrationist policies and objectives of the EU.
We must begin to think and act as an independent sovereign nation again and pursue what is best for the UK rather than be beholden and trapped in thinking inside an ideological framework of the CFP.

8. ***Which regional organisations, advisory bodies and scientific communities should the UK prioritise access to?***

a. Once the UK leaves the EU, could it uphold its membership of such organisations?

8.1 The United Kingdom is already a signatory and party to UNCLOS III and already works through and with the International Council for Exploration of the Seas (ICES). Through EU withdrawal and becoming a fully independent sovereign nation again we will be able to take our seat at the NEAFC and co-operate as outlined above with the other primary Nordic fisheries countries.

8.2 a) The UK will uphold its membership of these organisations and there is no particular reason we can foresee as to why not. However, the UK should, regarding fisheries, aim and legislate to never become enmeshed in a disaster like the CFP again. The UKs fishing industry and dependent coastal communities have been destroyed or/and 9.decimated once and cannot and should not be a second time.

9. ***What type of relationship with the EU would best suit the UK's interests?***

9.1 The United Kingdom should aim for a cordial relationship with the EU co-operating on fisheries only when necessary and when of mutual benefit.

9.2 The vote to leave the EU was a cry for the United Kingdom to become a fully independent sovereign nation state again able to control her own affairs and destiny for the interests and benefit of her people. Therefore, with regard to fisheries, we will or should aim, as outlined previously in all the questions above, regain control of our EEZ, work in only the broadest terms when necessary under international provisions with all other coastal states including the EU and never become enmeshed in such a tragic economic and environmental disaster like the CFP again. This would allow us to manage and husband one of our countries greatest renewable resources for the benefit of the nation and future generations who depend upon it.

10. What could the UK learn from the fisheries relationships between the EU and the Faroe Islands, Greenland, Iceland and Norway?

a. What do these examples tell us of the UK's future ability to restrict access to UK waters while trading with the EU?
b. What do these examples tell us of ways to achieve MSY and regional management?
c. What do these examples tells us about how to influence EU fisheries policy from outside the CFP?

10.1 The United Kingdom and the government should note from the experience of Norway and the other Nordic countries that independent, sovereign nations control and husband their fisheries in a far better manner than the mass bureaucracy of the EU where the over-riding principle of political integration over rules pragmatic, sensible, responsive management.

10.2 The relationship between the EU and these nations proves that we do not need to subvert control of our national interests to the EU in order to succeed. If small nations such as Norway and Iceland can prosper, especially in regard to fisheries, then it should not be beyond the United Kingdom of 65million people and one of the world's most powerful and successful nations to do so also.
The only thing that has stopped the UK from doing so is our membership of the EU driven by political ideology not the interests of strategic national benefit.

10.3 a) The examples of how Norway and Iceland stringently safeguard their fisheries and the historical precedent of them doing so (i.e. the Cod Wars) sets the precedent that the UK can quite easily follow. If the British distant water fleet was no longer to access these nations waters than there is no reason the UK cannot rescind access for EU vessels.

10.4 b) Politically the example of the Nordic nations shows that national control is massively beneficial both in allowing the nation to exploit all its resources but also in terms of fit for purpose management
Managerially there are a multitude of different ways to manage different fisheries but it must be in the way most applicable and suitable to a nations marine environment. **The UK has one of the most mixed fisheries in the world and therefore a system such as quota that works in Norway (with less mix) has been proven not to work here. Therefore, as the current quota system under the CFP has been both disastrous economically and environmentally the UK should look to the closest applicable fisheries example of Faroe and a Days at Sea system which works well in Faroe. Vested political or industry interests in the current system must not be allowed to jeopardize sustainable fishing practices for self-interest under the current system.**

10.5 c) The example of Norway and the other Nordic nations shows us that far greater power and leverage is available when a nation is in control of its own affairs rather than subservient to another authority such as the EU therefore the United Kingdom can and will incur massive benefits and should welcome the opportunity of being a free independent sovereign nation with the benefits it entails of being able to run our own affairs for our own benefit and interest.

<u>In Summary</u>
Brexit provides a one and only golden opportunity to harvest one of our nation's greatest renewable resources in a sustainable manner with a fit for purpose policy. It will provide the chance to rebuild the once proud UK fishing industry and coastal communities with the massive economic benefit entailed with the reclamation of our EEZ and fishing resources. Anything less for either political or a minority of vested industry interests would be a massive betrayal of the opportunity, Brexit and the Nation.

Submitted to the Clerk of

HOUSE OF LORDS

EUROPEAN UNION COMMITTEE

Energy and Environment Sub-Committee

Brexit: Fisheries

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